Abstract. To resolve the difficulties in deployment of the classic security solution S-BGP (Secure Border Gateway Protocol), the Translator Trust Model (TTM) for a new solution SE-BGP (Security Enhanced BGP) was proposed to transform the centralized deployment mode of S-BGP to distributed mode. However, the trust (attestations of routing information) translation of TTM only depends on a single hub node and this results in severe threats for the inter-domain routing system. To overcome the deficiencies of TTM, in this paper we improve TTM to Distributed TTM (DTTM) by expanding the single hub node to a set of selected multiple hub nodes; in our DTTM, the task of attestations is distributed over multiple hub nodes instead of on a single hub node. In order to make the hub nodes respond to the case of single node failures, we design a restoration mechanism to recover the network based on the neighbour-ring structure. Besides, we develop Cooperative Secure BGP (CS-BGP) to realize DTTM in BGP. In comparison with SE-BGP, our experimental results show that CS-BGP achieves an improved scalability, reduced convergence time and enhanced security.
order to solve the above problems, many approaches have been proposed. Secure BGP (S-BGP) [2] is the most classic, comprehensive and rigor solution in the area of BGP security. However, the centralized authentication mode and the way of "onion validation" lead to difficult deployment in the actual network. To address this problem, a series of improved solutions were proposed, but none of them has solved the problem completely. In 2007, Hu et al. [3] put forward a Trust Translator Model (TTM), and then in 2012, proposed the scheme realizing TTM in BGP called Security Enhance BGP(SE-BGP) [4] . Through decentralizing the centralized authentication mode of S-BGP to different self-organized AS alliances, the TTM indeed improves the ability of deploying the PKI, the scalability, and reduces the computational burden. However, the trust translation among AS alliances only depends on a single hub node. This will bring in too much traffic on the single hub node, causing the problem of network bottleneck and network breakdown due to the single node failure. The deficiencies of TTM motivate us to distribute the tasks of attestations from a single hub node to multiple hub nodes, hence extending TTM to Distributed TTM (DTTM). We first design a distributed multi-hub structure (DMHS) by partitioning an AS alliance into multiple sub-groups centred on multiple hub nodes. Based on DMHS, we build the DTTM which employs multiple hub nodes to implement trust translation among AS alliances and provide rescues in the case of hub node failures. Besides, we propose a new Cooperative Secure BGP (CS-BGP) by embedding DTTM into BGP. The experimental results show that CS-BGP solves the security problems of SE-BGP, and as well as improves the scalability and convergence performance.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: the first section introduces the related work in recent years and studies the existing solutions; Section 2 illustrates the principle of the TTM and discusses its deficiencies; Section 3 states the principle of our model -DTTM in detail; Section 4 introduces the recovery mechanism for hub nodes failures; Section 5 gives the approach of DTTM realization on BGP; Section 6 presents the results of experiments and analysis; Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
In order to address the security problems in BGP, two methods are proposed recently: One is to detect the abnormal messages to guarantee the security of BGP; The other is to adopt cryptographic technologies to prevent BGP from attacked.
For the first type, the solutions paid more attentions on how to look for a passive approach to detect the anomalies. One solution in this type is finding MOAS (Multiple Origin AS) [5] [6], which believes if an IP prefix is announced by multiple origin ASs, the event is invalid unless the messages are originated from a multi-home AS. Thus the anomalies can be detected by the conflicts of MOAS. In 2006, based on MOAS, Prefix Hijacking Alert Alarm (PHAS) [7] was proposed by the establishment of prefix ownership to judge the legitimacy of the messages. But the build of the registration for PHAS server and the security of the server itself have been ignored. Also, in 2006, Pretty Good BGP (PGP) [8] was presented. PGP builds a history database through delaying the messages forwarding and analyzing the stability of the network. Then, by comparing the messages with the items in the database, PGP decides which message should be discarded. Another famous solution Listen and Whisper [9] was designed as an alert system, which only serves when finding the inconsistency of routing in data plane and control plane. It is not hard to find that in this type, all these are just detective not preventive methods, thus too weak in terms of the security. In addition, the detection usually returns a result of high false positives and false negatives.
Compared with the first type, the second type uses the active ways and cryptographic techniques to provide higher security, which has become a main method. In this type, S-BGP is the earliest, most classic and integrated security solution so far. However, its "hierarchical" authentication mode and "onion" attestation manner cause the global PKI deployment obstacle, poor scalability and high computational overhead. In 2003, soBGP [10] was designed by Cisco to make up for the deficiencies of S-BGP. soBGP adopts a more flexible "trust web" authentication mode to replace the centralized mode in S-BGP; The path attestations are implemented only through the consistency with a static topology database, which posts another potential vulnerability to the system. Then in 2007, psBGP [11] came out for in search of balance between the security and the feasibility to cover the shortage in S-BGP. psBGP employs a distributed assertion prefix list (PAL) to authenticate the IP prefix owner instead of the hierarchical PKI in S-BGP, but this way lowers the security of IP prefix authentication. The verification of path attestation is still processed by the hierarchical PKI, which contradicts the adoption of the PAL instead of the PKI. HC-BGP [12] , FS-BGP [13] are also the follow-up work of S-BGP. HC-BGP attempts to use the hash chains to alleviate the burden of global PKI. However, whether the solution can protect BGP without PKI is doubtful. On the contrary, the authors of FS-BGP believe that the PKI is essential in BGP security solutions, so to improve the feasibility of S-BGP, FS-BGP chooses the way to reduce the cost of attestations and verifications rather than to solve the problem existed in deploying the centralized PKI. In recent years, another hot topic in this area is RPKI [14] -a new security infrastructure designed for supporting S-BGP or soBGP. But it is still controversial because it depends on the centralized authorities and posts a potential risk [15] . We have to acknowledge that though the research on BGP security has experienced more than ten years, no solution has been widely deployed in the real world [16] [17] . The deployment of BGP security solutions still face the big challenges.
In fact, there are three obstacles in deploying BGP security solutions in the actual network:
-The deployment of the centralized hierarchical PKI for authentication and certificates management. -The high computational overhead of processing signatures and verifications.
-The transition from BGP to adopting BGP security solutions [18] [19] .
From the current research, we find that most work concerns the second and the third aspects; The first aspect needs more work to be involved. Based on this, Hu et al. proposed SE-BGP based on the TTM, which has made progress in the first aspect. But there still exist severe security problems in TTM -network bottleneck and single node failure. The principle of TTM is employing a single hub node to translate the trust (attestations of routing information) among AS alliances. However, because there is only one translator, the excessive amount of traffic from/to the translator adds a heavy burden to the network which deteriorates the network performance severely. Also, the occurrence of single hub node failure can result in the communication interruption and network breakdown. In this paper, we propose the DTTM to translate trust among AS alliances by selecting multiple hub nodes to amortize the traffic on single hub node, and the recovery mechanism to cope with the case of single node failure. By employing DTTM in BGP, a security protocol CS-BGP is then developed.
3. Trust Translation among AS alliances 3.1. AS alliance AS network topology can be seen as an undirected graph. Every AS is regarded as a node, while the connections between any two ASs are the edges in the graph. According to the rich-club characteristic [20] of the AS network topology, the concept of AS alliance [3] is defined that it is a group of nodes organized by themselves and connected to the nodes in other AS alliances by minority nodes; The minority nodes derived from rich-club nodes are called hub nodes serving as a communication bridge among AS alliances. In [21] , the algorithm of generating AS alliances is presented in two steps: Firstly, confirm the hub node from rich nodes (generally larger ISPs) as the initial node for an AS alliance; Then add the non-hub customer nodes of the hub node to the AS alliance. If the added nodes still have non-hub customer nodes, continue addition until there are no nodes to add. The structure can be seen in Fig 
The Trust Translator Model (TTM)
Model principle. Prior to introducing the priciple of TTM, we first give two functions:
1. Sig x (y): the signature of information y by x. 2. V er x (y): the verification of signature information y by x.
The certificate authority (CA) established in every AS alliance is in charge of distributing certificates. As seen in Fig.1 , CA 1 ,CA 2 ,CA 3 are the authority of A 1 , A 2 and A 3 . The nodes in different AS alliances can't identify the certificates for each other except the hub nodes; hub nodes hold the certificates issued by CAs both in local AS alliances and foreign AS alliances because of their special identities and functions. Let's take an example to illustrate the principle of the TTM, as shown in Fig.1 . If node b in A 1 advertises an update message m, and reaches node a through the path b-h 1 -h 3 . Then:
Firstly, b signs m using the private key held by itself and forwards to hub node h 1 . h 1 can easily get the certificates of b from CA 1 and verify the signature utilizing the public key derived from the certificates. If V er h1 (Sig b (m)) succeeds, it generates Sig h1 (m b−h1 ) using the private key distributed by CA 3 and sends it to h 3 . If h 3 performs the verification of Sig h1 (m b−h1 ) using the certificates from CA 3 and of Sig b (m) using the certificates from CA 1 successfully, it will produce Sig h3 (m b−h1−h3 ), and then transmits to a together with Sig h1 (m b−h1 ). Finally, a compares the consistency of V er a (Sig h1 (m b−h1 )), V er a (Sig h3 (m b−h1−h3 )) and m to decide whether to receive the information and updates the routing table. If the result is not inconsistent, it discards the message.
Deficiencies. From the principle of the TTM, we can discover that as the unique hub node in AS alliance, it is regarded as a trust entity to translate the attestation information for all normal nodes in the same AS alliance. So, the single hub node is extremely easy to become the bottleneck point to affect the performance of the network. Also once the failure of single hub node happens, it might paralyse the network without any corresponding measures. Hence, in this paper, we propose the DTTM to overcome the deficiencies in TTM.
Distributed Trust Translation

Clustering feature in AS Network
It was observed in [22] [23] that an AS network is composed of multiple clusters. Usually, there are two metrics to measure these clusters: size and SCM (Scaled Coverage Measure). Size refers to the number of AS nodes in a cluster; SCM is a standard that evaluate the significance of a cluster, which is proportional to the size. Commonly, the communication among the nodes in different clusters is achieved through a center node. The hub node is infact the center of the cluster with the maximum size and SCM to take charge of messages forwarding and trust (signatures) translations among AS alliances.
In view of analysis above, we can find that there exist other clusters with smaller sizes and SCMs besides the biggest cluster gathered by Original Hub Node (OHN). Besides, the hub nodes are not just the hub of clusters, but ISPs of other normal nodes in the same cluster; The normal nodes are affiliated to the ISP node as their customers.
So, based on the above analysis, in our model, an AS alliance is partitioned into k sub-groups. The hub nodes of sub-groups confirmed by the hub nodes of the clusters, are responsible for messages forwarding both within AS alliances and among AS alliances. They can amortize the network flows, computational cost on the single hub node, and reduce the bottleneck effects. Even if one hub node encounters the failures, other nodes are able to switch the routing to another hub node to maintain the normal communication.
Distributed Multi-hub Structure (DMHS)
Firstly, we give a method to select multiple hub nodes within an AS alliance A i (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Supposing the number of selected hub nodes is a given value k(k = 2, 3, ..., n), instead of a single hub node, k hub nodes will serve as "translators" to undertake the delivery of update messages among AS alliances.
Hub nodes selection. An AS network can be represented as a graph G = (V, E): V = {v i | i = (1, 2, ..., n)} denotes the set of all AS nodes; E = {e i | i, j = (1, 2, ..., n), i = j} denotes the edges between any two nodes v i . d vi denotes node degree, that is the total numbers of edges connected to a node v i .
Implementation steps:
1. Cluster partition: Firstly, in the generated topology graph G Ai = (V Ai , E Ai ) of A i , employ the existing partition algorithm to get m clusters with different sizes and SCM values, denoted as Cl Ai .
Confirm the hub nodes of the clusters: For any cluster cl Ai−x , the hub node is the node with the maximum node degree. If use h Ai−m represents the hub node of the mth cluster, then,
In this way, we can select m hub nodes and get a set Hub Ai = {h i−1 , h Ai−2 , ..., h Ai−m }.
Sub-groups generation. Cluster distance dist(x, y): It refers to the distances between two clusters in the same AS alliance. For x, y ∈ cl Ai , there is dist(x, y) = min{dist(h Ai−x , h Ai−y )} Implementation steps:
1. According to the size or SCM of the cluster, sort all the elements of Cl Ai in a descending order and get a new set Cl Ai = {cl Ai−1 , cl Ai−2 , ..., cl Ai−m }. 2. Select k maximum clusters, denoted as g Ai−1 (0), g Ai−2 (0), ..., g Ai−k (0). 3. Remove the selected k clusters, we can get a new set
For every element in Cl Ai , implement the following algorithm:
Finally, we get k sub-groups: g Ai−1 , g Ai−2 , ..., g Ai−m .
Confirmation of hub nodes of sub-groups. If H Ai is the set of all hub nodes of subgroups, then
That is, k hub nodes are separately the hub nodes of g Ai−1 (0), g Ai−2 (0), ..., g Ai−m (0).
Connection among hub nodes. The connection among multiple hub nodes should meet the following two conditions:
1. Maximize the efficiency of routing messages transmission among multiple hub nodes with low cost; 2. Minimize the impact of the failures and rapidly recover the interrupted network in the event of hub nodes failures.
If we only consider the first condition, a full-mesh structure would be the best choice.
Since the number of hops between any two hub nodes is only one, the transmission of messages can be delivered most efficiently. However, the following deficiencies exist in the full-mesh structure:
-The number of connections grows as the square of the number of hub nodes, which deteriorates the scalability of the structure; -The storage of certificates on hub nodes expands as the increase of connections among hub nodes; -(k − 1) nodes and link failures caused by the failure of a single node can trigger routing oscillations, resulting in the extra cost of routing table updates, packet losses, and hence worsen the network performance.
Fig. 2. Structure of DMHS
In view of the defects discussed above, considering k is normally given a bigger value(k > 4), we construct a two-level ring, where OHN locates at the first level ring and other hub nodes form the second ring centred on OHN. Though in comparison with the full mesh, the numbers of hops increase to two at most, it improve other aspects:
-The number of connections reduces from
to 2(k − 1), thus the scalability can be increased.
-The storage of certificates on hub nodes can be decreased; -The number of impacted hub nodes except OHN is reduced from 1 to 3 k−1 . Besides, the second type structure is more consistent with the actual network. Therefore, for k > 4 (normally, k is definitely greater than 4), we adopt a two-level ring to better meet the demands of DMHS. The structure of DMHS can be seen in Fig.2. 
The Distributed Translator Trust Model (DTTM)
Certificates distribution. In DTTM, regardless of intra-or inter-alliance, the trust translation can't be accomplished unless holding the related certificates. So, we will firstly specify how to distribute the certificates.
Suppose there are two AS alliances A i , A j ; g Ai−x is a sub-group in A i and g Aj −y is its directly conncected subgroup in A j . CA i and CA j are the authorities to issue the certificates in A i and A j respectively. As the translator among AS alliances, each hub node in A i and A j holds the certificates issued by both CA i and CA j . The rules of certificates distribution are:
-Intra-alliance: The normal nodes in g Ai−x hold the certificates of nodes in the same sub-group and of hub nodes in the directly connected sub-groups. The hub node of g Ai−x holds the certificates of all nodes in the same sub-group and of all the nodes in the directly connected sub-groups. -Inter-alliances: All the normal nodes in g Ai−x hold the certificates of hub node of g Aj −j . The hub node of g Aj −x holds the certificates of all the nodes and neighbours of the hub node in A j .
The DTTM principle. Different from TTM, Multiple hub nodes work collaboratively to achieve the translation of trust both in intra-and inter-AS alliances. We will illustrate the principle of DTTM through an example. Assuming a is a normal node in g Ai−x , b is a normal node in g Aj −p ; they connect to each other through g Aj −y . h Ai−x ,h Aj −p and h Aj −y are the hub nodes of the three sub-groups respectively. When a announces an update message m, and b receives, the trust translation will be processed as the following: 
6. If
) successfully (*both use certificate granted by CAA j *);
) and sends it together with
m a−h
A i −x −h A j −y = V er d (Sig h A j −y (m a−h A i −x −h A j −y ));
A i −x −h A j −y −h A j −p = V er d (Sig h A j −p (m a−h A i −x −h A j −y −h A j −p ));
If m a−h
12. Done;
Recovery of hub node failures in DTTM
In this section, we propose a recovery scheme based on the hierachical neighbour-rings (NRs) to provide timely recovery for any single hub node failure. In the fourth part of Section 4.2., we have constructed a two-level ring. Then we construct the third-level logic ring consisting of the neighbours of the hub nodes on the second ring. To identify their levels in NRs, we assign each node an unique hierarchical ID number. Every node on NRs selects the backup nodes for their centric nodes, and stores them in local tables in advance. Once a node detects a failure, it can immediately find the appropriate nodes from the table to take over the work of the failed node. It can be seen that because the backup nodes have been selected and stored before the occurrence of the failure, the large amounts of consumption on time and costs can be avoided in the process of the recovery. The mechanism mainly includes two stages: pre-recovery preparation and failure recovery process.
Pre-recovery preparation
Before the recovery of a hub node failure, we take three steps for pre-recovery preparation:
1. Construction of hierarchical NRs. Each NR is built by all the one-hop neighbours of each hub node and identified by the ID number of the centric node. Assuming N R i is the ith NR, c is the centric node, and N ei(c, j) is the jth neighbour of c, then
There are totally three-level NRs: The first-level NR is OHN itself; The second-level NR is constructed by the neighbours of OHN; The third-level NRs are constructed by the neighbours of the nodes on the second-level ring. 2. ID number allocation for nodes on NRs. To identify the level of the nodes in all NRs, every node should be allocated an unique hierarchical ID number. The hierarchical ID number is consisted of two parts: prefix and suffix. They are separated by a dot. The prefix represents the number of centric node; the suffix represents the sequence number on the NR of the centric node. All the sequence number of suffix on the ring is arranged in an ascending order. As shown in Fig.3 , "1" is the ID number of OHN; "1.3" is on the NR with the center at "1" and a sequence number "3"; "1.3.1" is on the NR with the center at "1.3" and a sequence number "1". Fig. 3 . NR recovery structure 3. Storage of backup nodes. To quickly find the appropriate replacement nodes, the nodes on NRs should store the selected backup nodes in advance to deal with the failure events. Normally, the backup nodes are stored in backup nodes tables (BNTs). There are two types of BNTs: One records the nodes with ID numbers at the level of not smaller than the nodes themselves, denoted as NLL-BNT(No Lower Level-BNT); The other records the nodes with ID numbers at a lower level, denoted as LL-BNT(Lower Level-BNT). In NLL-BNT, the items are recorded by the preference, while in LL-BNT, the items are only recorded by the ID numbers. The preference is a value determined by node degrees. The smaller the node degree is, the fewer the number of links and the potential network flows are. So, to avoid bringing in the extra burden on the replacement hub node, we prefer selecting the node with fewer node degrees and give this nodes a lower preference. If this node is a hub node, it stores NLL-BNT and LL-BNT; Otherwise, stores NLL-BNT. Table 1 is an example of NLL-BNT. 
Embedding DTTM into BGP
In this section, we propose an approach called CS-BGP to embed DTTM into BGP. Similar with S-BGP, the data of CS-BGP is carried on two optional, transitive attributes of BGP update message: AS Source Evidence and AS Route Evidence. AS Source Evidence stores the signatures of IP address prefixes, which indicates whether the original AS has right to announce the IP address prefixes; AS Route Evidence stores the signatures of the routing information by each transit AS. As there are different functions between hub nodes and normal nodes, the principles are also different. In our scheme, multiple hub nodes indeed are the ISPs of different levels; they themselves are more powerful in process ability and security, but they are possibly to suffer attacks. In this case we can consider designing a monitor system for multiple hub nodes to supervise mutually. But here, we suppose all hub nodes are not exposed to attack and trusted by other nodes. Next we will introduce how CS-BGP works.
6.1. Realization on hub nodes 7. Experiment and Analysis
Security
Our work aims at solving the problems of network traffic bottleneck and single node failures.
For the first problem, we apportion the tasks of attestations on a single hub node in AS alliance to k hub nodes. So, the burden on the single hub node can be reduced to 1 k . The result depends on the value of k. Thus, the greater k is, the more bottleneck effect reduces.
For the second problem, the cooperation of multiple hub nodes can avoid the single node failure and the normal communication among AS alliances. Besides, the neighbours of each hub node store the selected backup nodes in advance. Thus, when a single hub node fails, the neighbours can quickly find the replacement node and extract the related information, then switch the routing messages to it. In general, the default time of heartbeat is 60 seconds, the time of BGP session establishment is around tens of milliseconds. So the time of recovery will be limited to an acceptable range.
Scalability
Suppose the number of AS nodes in every AS alliance is the same; the number of AS nodes in every sub-group is also the same. The following experiment will compare SE-BGP with CS-BGP in the number of certificates and analyze the scalability of the two models. Firstly, we introduce some related notations, as shown below: Then, total numbers of certificates held by normal ASs:
Total numbers of certificates held by hub nodes:
Total numbers of certificates held by all nodes:
Maximum numbers of certificates held by single normal node:
Maximum numbers of certificates held by single hub node:
As the network scale grows, the number of certificates also increases; the comparison of certificates numbers can be seen in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 . From the graphs we can conclude that in two cases, the certificate numbers of DTTM are both smaller than that of TTM. Besides, Fig.4 compares the case of k = 6 with k = 9. It is easy to see as k increases, the number of certificates decreases and the scalability gets better. 
Network convergence
Compared with the original BGP, in SE-BGP and CS-BGP, the network convergence gets worse because of the process of digital signature and validation. In the two solutions, they both adopt the DSA signature algorithm. And the signature time of DSA is about 25.5ms, and the validation time is about 31.0ms [24] .
In this section, we employ ns2 [25] to perform the experiment and compare the convergence of BGP, SE-BGP and CS-BGP. The first step is using network topology generator BRITE [26] to generate 10 types of BA model topologies three times. The 10 topologies are: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50 . Suppose that there is only one router in one AS, the minimum route advertisement interval (MARI) is 30s and the link delay is 1ms.
The experiment is designed as follows: a. BGP: Every AS announces one IP address prefix; b. SE-BGP: In 10 topologies, we select two nodes with the maximum node degree as the hub nodes, and divide two AS alliances centred on the hub nodes. Let all the nodes except hub nodes advertise a routing message; c. CS-BGP: First, Partition the AS in each As alliance into 3 sub-groups except the case of in 5,10 topology. Second, Partition the AS into 4 sub-groups when the topologies are 40,45,50. Then, let the ASs announce the Update messages as b. Finally, compute the convergence time of the entire network in the above scenes, and then make comparisons. The results are shown in Fig.6 :
From Fig.6 we know that: In a real network, the size of AS has been over 50000 [27] , thus, the bigger k will benefit the convergence of the entire network.
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a distributed trust translation model DTTM by distributing the tasks of attestations from single hub node to multiple hub nodes. Our DTTM is established by first dividing an AS into multiple sub-groups, and then for each sub-group selecting a hub node taking charge of the tasks of attestations for all nodes within the sub-group. After that we constructed logic NRs to locate the backup nodes for each hub node and assigned an unique ID number for each node in NRs. Each node on NRs selects and stores the backup nodes in advance so as to switch the routing quickly when the failures happen. In addition, we proposed CS-BGP to realize the DTTM in BGP. Finally, the experimental results show that CS-BGP resolves the security deficiencies of SE-BGP and improves network scalability and convergence.
